Srebrenica:

Problems of participation in UN/NATO operations

Chronology

- *Summer 1993*: UN Security Council declares safe-havens including Srebrenica
- *Early 1995*: Bosnian-Serb forces surround Srebrenica. Skirmishing with Dutch forces
- *May 1995*: UN/NATO bomb Bosnian-Serb forces. UNPROFOR personnel taken hostage
- *July 10-13, 1995*: Bosnian-Serbs attack and capture Srebrenica
- 8,000 Muslims murdered, 25,000 deported

Factors

- Forces committed without adequate firepower
- Nations w/forces on the ground sensitive to tactics that provoke the Bosnian-Serbs
- “Dual key” process undermines credibility
- Denial of air strikes interpreted as weak will
- Unity of command violated
- Authority/responsibility violated
- Dutch antipathy affect judgment?

Questions

- What are “reasonable defensive measures”
- Dutch commander responsibility
- What were Dutch options?
- UN order: good faith or setup?
- Responsibility of higher commander
- Institutional and/or systemic factors contributing to decision-making

Lessons Learned

- *TRUST*
- Forces should not be deployed without:
  - Adequate firepower for mission and self-defense
  - Clear and quantifiable objectives
  - Consistent international, political and military objectives
  - Unified and responsible chain of command
  - *Personnel trained to act rightfully in extremely complex situations with significant moral, humanitarian and international implications*